

**Undermining a rival party's issue competence through negative campaigning:
Experimental evidence from the USA, Denmark, and Australia**

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Abstract. Much party communication encourages voters to lower issue-related evaluations of rival parties. Yet, studies of such influence are rare. Drawing on research on political parties' negative campaigning, this paper starts to fill this gap. We triangulate evidence from four survey experiments across six issues in Denmark, the US, and Australia, and show that a party's negative campaigning decreases voters' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence (i.e. issue ownership), but does not backlash on voters' evaluations of the sponsor. Such attack on the target party does not have to be tied to a negative policy development like the crime rate to undermine the target party's competence evaluations. At the same time, a negative policy development only undermines a party's evaluations when it is accompanied by a rival party's negative campaigning attack. The implications for party competition and the mass-elite linkage are important.

Key words: Issue ownership, political parties, negative campaigning, mass-elite linkage.

A cornerstone of representative democracy is that voters form opinions about candidates and parties in order to elect representatives to parliament. This is a demanding task, and research increasingly focuses on how party communication assists voters in forming opinions (Pardos-Prado & Sagarzazu, 2016; Seeberg, 2018; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). Although much party communication aims to undermine a rival party's reputation in the public (Lau & Pomper, 2004; Nai & Walter, 2015), research rarely focuses on this central aspect of party competition. This is also true for the accelerating body of research on voters' evaluations of political parties' issue-handling competence, so-called issue ownership (Egan 2013; Jennings & Green, 2017; Seeberg 2017), which mostly studies how a party can beef up its own issue ownership (see, e.g., Dahlberg and Martinsson 2015; Stubager & Seeberg, 2016; Walgrave et al., 2009) rather than study the effects of rival party attacks. Yet, adopting the lens of negative campaigning research to study the phenomena of issue ownership attack is likely to be particularly relevant. Negative campaigning is perhaps one of the most distinctive features of contemporary election campaigns (Lau & Pomper, 2004; Nai & Walter, 2015), and issue ownership attacks can be detrimental to a party's electoral success. The literature provides several case-studies - e.g., Bill Clinton in the US (Holian, 2004), Tony Blair in the UK (Norris, 1997), and Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen, 2004) in Denmark – showing how competing actors attacked their way into office by using negative campaigning towards their rivals' issue reputations.

To take a first step to more systematically understand if a party can undermine a rival party's issue ownership, this paper analyses to what extent a party's negative campaigning towards a rival party undermines the rival's reputation in the public for issue-handling capacity without backlash effects on the sponsor party. Such attacks often come in connection to a negative policy development such as increasing crime in which the party aims to make voters blame the rival party for the problem and its poor performance (Seeberg, 2018; Thesen, 2013).

Hence, in order to deepen the understanding of the effects of negative campaigning on a rival party's issue ownership, the paper innovates analytically by keeping problems and negative campaigning apart in order to investigate how they go together. Whereas the negative policy development makes a party's negative message more relevant and therefore should increase the influence of the message on the rival's issue ownership, we also expect that negative campaigning makes a negative policy development more relevant for voters' competence evaluations of the rival party.

In this way, the paper makes three contributions: (1) It studies how a party can undermine voters' evaluations of a rival party's competence; (2) It brings together two prominent research agendas on negative campaigning and issue ownership to understand the effects of party communication on voter evaluations; (3) It advances an increasing scholarly interest in disentangling the influence of party communication and the policy development on voter evaluations (Pardos-Prado & Sagarzazu, 2016; Seeberg, 2018). To make these contributions, we extend on the increasing number of non-US studies of negative campaigning (Dolezal et al., 2016; Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010; Hansen & Pedersen, 2008; Pattie et al., 2011; Ridout & Walter, 2013; Walter et al., 2014) and triangulate evidence from four original survey experiments on the issues of health care, immigration, the economy, unemployment benefits, agriculture, and rural development in the diverse settings of Denmark, Australia, and the US.

Taking on this task has important implications for our account of the mass-elite linkage. If a party can alter the connection between a rival party and voters – as expressed in the issue ownership (Petrocik 1996) – the mass-elite linkage appears more fluid than often portrayed in the sense that voters can be persuaded to party defection. Moreover, against the idea of representative democracy, the mass-elite linkage comes out as quite elite-driven in the sense that parties tell voters what to think more than the other way around.

Undermining a rival party's issue ownership

In his seminal piece on issue ownership, Petrocik (1996, p. 826) considers issue ownership the “critical constant” between elections. As recent studies confirm (Seeberg, 2017), issue ownership certainly has a highly stable long-term component – over time, the same party tends to be considered more competent to handle an issue by the voters. However, this does not mean that issue ownership cannot fluctuate in the short run (and even the longer run) and, at times, temporarily change hands (Egan, 2013; Stubager, 2018; Walgrave et al., 2009). Even if just temporary, such deviations from the long-term pattern may as demonstrated in case-studies (see, e.g., Holian, 2004, Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen 2004) be electorally consequential and send the incumbent party out of office because of a decline in voters' evaluations of its issue-handling competences. These potential short-term fluctuations in issue ownership are the starting point of this study.

A common characteristic of issue ownership research is that it is primarily concerned with what a party can do to beef up its own issue ownership rating (see, e.g., Dahlberg and Martinsson 2015; Stubager & Seeberg, 2016; Walgrave et al., 2009; a noteworthy exception is Tresch et al., 2013). This focus comes at the neglect of looking at what a party can do to hit its rival party's issue ownership rating at a time where short-term issue ownership changes due to attacks are common and highly consequential for electoral outcomes (Arndt 2014; Holian 2004, Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen 2004, Norris 2001). This leaves a partial account of what forms a party's issue ownership since any vote-seeking party can be expected to work hard to impede its rival party's standing in the electorate.

Recently, the concept of issue ownership has been much debated (Walgrave et al., 2012, Stubager 2018, Lefevere et al. 2017). We follow Stubager (2018) and focus on ‘competence issue ownership’ rather than ‘associative issue ownership’ as the former concept comes closer to the initial idea of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996): While voters for instance may associate the issue of immigration spontaneously with a far-right party (‘associative issue ownership’), they nevertheless see the main center-right party as most competent in actually handling the issue (‘competence issue ownership’). By focusing on the latter, we also distinguish our study from Tresch et al. (2013), who study if parties can steal rival parties’ associative issue ownership.

In terms of competence, research on the sources of issue ownership finds that a party acquires issue ownership primarily through continuously strong performance on the issue (Green and Jennings, 2011; Stubager & Seeberg, 2016). This also means that a negative policy development such as increasing crime as well as blame for bad performance from, e.g., rival parties can come in the way, and this is exactly what we will focus on in the following. Our focus on how parties’ blame-oriented communication influence rival parties’ issue ownership departs from most previous work not only by focusing on the rival party (Egan, 2013; Stubager & Seeberg, 2016; Walgrave et al., 2009), but more specifically also by going into the content of the party communication and how this play together with the actual policy development: we distinguish positive and negative communication (cf. below). Pioneering work on a rival party’s influence on issue ownership by Tresch et al. (2013) only looks at messages as such even if such messages may have very different impact depending on the actual content, like positive vs negative, and does not take the policy development into account although it is the basis of party performance and competence evaluations. By drawing on the literature on negative campaigning, we take the next step below.

Which messages matter and when?

In order to advance our knowledge on what a party can actually say to undermine its opponent's issue ownership, and within the framework of communication intended to harm the opponent, we naturally draw on prominent research on the effects of political parties' negative campaigning (Nai & Walter, 2015).

Negative campaigning

Research on the effects of political parties' negative campaigning is abundant, and there is evidence that this type of communication affects a wide range of phenomena and attitudes, from turnout to electoral results, from voters' ambivalence to their cynicism (e.g., Lau and Pomper, 2004; Nai, 2014). Although so far not concerned with the issue ownership of a rival party, scholars of negative campaigning have developed a strong account of how and when a party's campaigning against an opponent affects the opponent's electoral fortunes and its overall perception by the electorate (Fridkin & Kenney, 2004; Lau & Pomper, 2004; Pinkleton, 1997). Yet, even if issue ownership is a major ingredient in the vote choice (Meguid & Belanger, 2008), the former does not reduce to the latter (Stubager et al., 2018). Analytically, the concept of issue ownership is attractive because it offers more clarity to the study of the effects of issue-based negative campaigning because it evaluates the effects at the issue-level and not at the aggregate vote-choice. Even if the literature on negative campaigning has primarily been developed in a US context, an emerging comparative research agenda suggests that it may also apply to European parliaments with high party discipline and, therefore, presumably less focus on persons and more focus on what the party can offer (Dolezal et al., 2016; Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010;

Hansen & Pedersen, 2008; Pattie et al., 2011; Ridout & Walter, 2013; Walter et al., 2014; Nai and Walter, 2015).

To put it simply, “going negative” against your rivals entails attacking them instead of advocating your own strengths and ideas, so-called “positive campaigning” (Nai & Walter, 2015). There are two types of negative campaigning attacks. On the one hand, *issue-based* attacks, also called “policy” attacks (Benoit, 2015), are framed around the idea that the rivals’ performance or program on specific policies is bad or harmful. On the other hand, *person-based* (or *character*) attacks are framed towards the rivals themselves and are aimed at degrading rivals’ characters, personalities, values, or behavior. In this article, we focus on issue-based attacks because of the nature of the dynamics studied here. Our goal is to show through which messages a party is able to reduce voters’ perceptions of its rival’s capacity to handle specific *issues*; negative messages stressing the rivals’ shortcomings on those issues thus seem the natural candidate for our study.

Issue-based negative messages provide reasons for voters to disregard the rival party and, generally, degrade the perception of that party’s capabilities to handle the issues at stake. Although the overall net effects of negative campaigning on electoral outcomes are still questioned (Lau et al., 2007), there is evidence that a sponsor’s negative messages are an effective way to reduce voters’ positive feelings for the target party (Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2010; Pinkleton, 1997). We extend these results by expecting that a sponsor’s issue-based negative messages are effective in reducing the target party’s issue-handling reputation among voters on those issues.

Hypothesis 1: An issue-based negative message towards a target party decreases the target party’s issue-handling competence.

Negative vs. positive campaigning

Instead of attacking the rivals' record on an issue, a party can also advance its own strengths at handling the issues (positive campaigning). Although positive campaigning is the opposite of negative campaigning, a party's positive campaigning might also influence a rival's issue ownership. Even without explicitly communicating about the rival party, positive messages might indirectly reduce positive evaluations of the opponent by simply shifting the positive focus towards the sponsor of the message. Yet, as a cue to the voter's party evaluations, negative messages convey a direct appeal to voters to disregard the rival party's issue-handling and can therefore be expected to be more effective than positive messages (advocating for the sponsor's qualities, see also Fridkin & Kenney, 2004). Moreover, existing research points towards a "negativity bias" according to which "people are more reactive and attentive to negative news than they are to positive news" (Soroka & McAdams, 2010, pp. 2–3). This perception bias acts in the way that "negative information may be more likely than comparable positive information to be noticed and processed, thereby having the opportunity to get its message across" (Lau & Pomper, 2002, p. 47).

Hypothesis 2: An issue-based negative message decreases the target's issue-handling competence more strongly than an issue-based positive message.

No backlash effects of negative campaigning

Negative messages are potentially a risky business, and they may not immediately benefit the attacking party (sponsor) even if they depress voters' faith in the target's competences. Because

voters tend generally to dislike negativity, attacks can backfire and end up hurting the sponsor party more than the target. Such “backlash effect” (Roese & Sande, 1993) may take place if voters perceive the negative campaigning as ungrounded, inappropriate, or simply vile. Negative messages in this perspective are thus seen as a gamble where a party dares to discredit a rival party, and it collects the payoffs only if voters buy the argument. If voters do not buy the argument, then the sponsor’s credibility is called into question. Indeed, there is evidence of such backlash effects (Fridkin & Kenney, 2004; Hitchon & Chang, 1995; Pinkleton, 1997).

However, in our case, we do not expect negative messages to backfire against the sponsor of the message. First, such backlash effects might be substantially more likely for character attacks than for issue attacks (Budesheim et al., 1996; Carraro et al., 2010); our models test for the effects of the latter, and thus, backlash effects should be minimal.¹ Second, and perhaps even more importantly, when negative messages backlash, they are more likely to harm the “warmth” associated with the source (how much we find it likeable) and not its perceived competence (how much we think the source is competent to handle its tasks; Carraro & Castelli 2010). Here, we focus on the sponsor’s perceived competence (at handling the issues at stake), which should only be marginally affected by backlash effects because of the sponsor’s use of issue-based negative messages. Finally, if voters lose faith in the target party’s competences, they may turn to the sponsor instead and increase their faith in this party’s competences. This may also take place in a multiparty system with many other parties to turn to because the sponsor through its negative campaigning draws voters’ attention to this party as the first alternative to the target party. This counteracts a backlash effect and make a negative net-effect unlikely.

Hypothesis 3: An issue-based negative message towards a target party does not decrease the sponsor’s issue-handling competence (no backlash effect).

Negative campaigning and the policy development

A party's attacks on a rival party's issue-handling competence often come in connection to a negative policy development on the issue such as an increasing crime rate or surgery waiting lists (Seeberg, 2018; Thesen 2013). The mission of the attacking party (sponsor) is to define how the public perceives of this development (Boin et al., 2009). Ultimately, a major goal of the sponsor's communication is to make the public blame the target party for the problems and leave a poor performance evaluation of the target party (Marsh & Tilley, 2009). Although much party competition centers on problems and how to define how bad and urgent the problem is (Baumgartner et al., 2011; Seeberg, 2018), this is not reflected in the broader literature on the effect of party communication on public opinion formation (see, e.g., Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010) or on the effects of negative campaigning more specifically (see, e.g., Nai & Walter 2015). At the same time, information about problems and a party's performance in tackling the problems has been shown to be central to voters' perceptions of parties' issue ownership. For instance, Green and Jennings (2011) show that a party's issue ownership is particularly exposed to change when a party is in office because here, it is held to account for problems that emerge. Yet, this research on problems and issue ownership is rarely connected to party communication. Hence, we take a first step to fill this void.

Within the framework of negative messages, factual information about the policy development on the issues at stake has the potential to increase the *relevance* of the attack; given that such attacks are more likely to provide substantive reasons for voters to be suspicious about the target (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011), relevant (or "useful") attacks are more likely to alter the evaluative judgments of those who are exposed to them. To the contrary, irrelevant attacks (i.e.

unsupported by actual problems) are more likely to simply be dismissed as shrill or senseless.

This echoes research in cognitive psychology showing that relevant messages are more likely to persuade and change opinions (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Hypothesis 4: An issue-based negative message decreases a target party's issue-handling competence more strongly when accompanied by information about a negative policy development.

To be sure, whether a factual information is “relevant” or not is in the eye of the beholder, which is something that we are not able to assess (or manipulate) in our experiment. The point we are trying to make here is that political messages (attacks, in this case) that are accompanied by factual information are more likely to be effective, because they are more likely to be perceived as relevant or legitimate. In this sense, our fourth hypothesis can be seen as a nod to the developing literature on fact-based political communication (e.g., Allen and Stevens 2018) and, beyond that, the increasing importance of exposure to “fake news” instead of hard facts for the development of political cynicism and decreasing efficacy (e.g., Balmas 2014).

Previous research would actually suggest a two-way street between issue-based negative message and information about a negative policy development in the sense that the latter not only influences the impact of the former, but the former also influences the impact of the latter. Research on the economy for instance shows that parties can influence how voters perceive of the economy and the extent to which they blame the incumbents for a negative policy development (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu 2016, Seeberg 2018). This is because policy developments oftentimes are neither clearly bad nor unambiguously good – the crime rate might for instance be increasing but only slowly and less so than in neighboring countries – which makes the description of the development open for debate (Boin et al., 2009). Here, party

communication helps voters form an opinion. Hence, the analysis will look at the two-way interaction between issue-based negative message and information about a negative policy development.

As party communication is usually carefully crafted to be immediately persuasive on voters compared to plain and rough information about a policy development, we expect to see that rival party communication makes a greater impact on the influence of a policy development on voters' assessments of the party than vice versa. Moreover, the argument that information about a negative policy development enhances the impact of negative campaigning implies that negative campaigning unaccompanied might not have a discernible effect. Hence, H1 (on the general effect of negative campaigning) might therefore not gain much support and H2 (negative vs. positive campaigning) might only be true when negative campaigning is accompanied by information about a negative policy development.

Four experiments across six issues in three countries

The four hypotheses are tested in four survey experiments on the issues of unemployment benefits, agriculture, and rural development in Denmark in 2016, the economy in Australia in 2017, and the issues of health and immigration in the US in 2017 and 2018. This design provides a very diverse setting in which to test the argument. Hence, if the findings from the empirical analysis are consistent across issues and countries, this offers a solid base for evaluating the strategies. The conclusions then apply for three very different political systems, namely, the US presidential two-party system, the federal Australian system, and the Danish parliamentary multiparty system as well as two issues, agriculture and immigration, on which right-wing parties have issue ownership according to previous research, two issue, unemployment benefits

and health care, on which left-wing parties have issue ownership, and two issues, the economy and rural development on which no party has a clear issue ownership (Egan 2013; Petrocik 1996; Seeberg 2017).ⁱⁱ Moreover, as the year following the inauguration of US President Trump might be considered rather unusual (Nai et al. 2018), we replicate our 2017 US experiment in late 2018.

Another reason for selecting these countries is that it allows a test of the hypotheses on a well-known case of negative campaigning in the US (see, e.g., Lau and Pomper 2002, 2004) and cases of limited knowledge on negative campaigning in Denmark (see Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010; Hansen & Pedersen, 2008) and Australia. Hence, our case-selection reflects the increasing interest in negative campaigning beyond the US (Dolezal et al., 2016; Nai and Walter, 2015; Pattie et al., 2011; Ridout & Walter, 2013; Walter et al., 2014). As noted by Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2015: 748), the multiparty context such as in Denmark or Australia is clearly the one most parties in the Western world find themselves in, and Denmark and Australia are therefore a natural point of departure in order to move beyond the US. At the same time our analysis of the US ensures an accumulation of knowledge around negative campaigning on a much-researched case. Issue ownership research is similar in the sense that it has been and still is prominent in the US (see, e.g., Petrocik 1996; Egan 2013) and only came to Denmark lately (see, e.g., Stubager and Seeberg 2016; Stubager 2018). Research on negative campaigning in Denmark indicates that it is much less common than in the US (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010; Hansen & Pedersen, 2008). The Australian case is important because it adds another example outside the US – and a case that is related to, but at the same time clearly different from the Danish one. Like Denmark, Australia features a multiparty system, but one that much closer resembles the Westminster two-party system with the historic dominance in the Australian parliament of two opposed camps (Labor and the Liberals/Nationals coalition) and a multitude of scattered small parties. While similar on several regards, the three cases investigated in this article diverge quite substantially

in terms of electoral systems (PR open list for Denmark, Alternative voting for Australia (Karp et al., 2018), and Single-Member Plurality for the US); also as a result, the fragmentation of the party system diverges quite substantially, as shown for instance by the different number of “effective” number of competing parties in the three cases (DK=5.6, AU=3.4, US=2.1; Gallagher, 2014). The political culture across the three countries is also radically different, as illustrated for instance by the different share of female MPs (DK=39.1, AU=24.7, US=17.8; Gallagher, 2014). Although our analysis is not interested in country differences per se, Denmark and Australia provide an important contrast case to the US that allows to test if the effect of negative campaigning applies across varying contexts.

The Danish survey uses a nationally representative sample ($N=1513$)ⁱⁱⁱ collected by a Danish polling company, Epinion, between 24 October and 3 November 2016 through a web survey (see section I in the on-line appendix). In this period, Denmark had a single-party, right-wing minority government led by the Liberals (“Venstre”). For each of the three strategies, the main opposition party, the Social Democrats (“the sponsor”) attack the Prime Minister party, the Liberals (“the target”). Hence, we focus on the two main parties on the centre-left and centre-right (like in the Australian case, see below). This implies that we leave the remaining parties in the Danish (and Australian) multiparty system to future studies. Even if this limits the analysis of multiparty dynamics, the inclusion of a multiparty system to the analysis (and a federal, multiparty system in Australia with two dominant parties) in addition to a presidential, two-party system, such as the US, is important for the generalizability of the results: the analysis of the multiparty systems in Denmark and Australia reveals if an attack by, e.g., the large centre-left mainstream party impacts voters’ evaluations of the large centre-right mainstream party. This is important because a lack of clarity of responsibility in multiparty systems makes it harder for voters to identify which party is to blame (Hobolt et al. 2013). To maintain external validity of

the experiment and to make sure that the hypothesis test focuses on the target party's issue-handling competence, the experimental conditions in Denmark are set up around three policy reforms which the newly elected Liberals government enacted in the autumn of 2015 and spring of 2016, i.e. six to twelve months before our survey was fielded.

The first US survey was collected through the web, between 22 November and 6 December 2017, using the Amazon MTurk (N 1310).^{iv} The data are unweighted. As Clifford et al (2015) demonstrate, the MTurk sample can be used to study public opinion formation through experiments. In this period, the Republicans had the presidency and a majority in both chambers of the US Congress. In the survey, the Democrats (“the sponsor”) attack the Republicans (“the target”) on the issue of immigration, which the Republicans own, and vice versa on the issue of health care on which the Democrats have issue ownership (Seeberg, 2017a).

The second US survey was also collected through the web, in August 2018, via Amazon MTurk (N 1800). This survey replicates the experimental design used during the first MTurk survey in late 2017. In this case as well, Democrats (“the sponsor”) attack the Republicans (“the target”) on the issue of immigration, which the Republicans own, and vice versa on the issue of health care. Much has happened in the USA in recent years in terms of health care (most notably, the failed attempt to “repeal and replace” Obamacare) and immigration (most notably, uncertainty surrounding the DACA program, the fate of children of illegal immigrants separated from their parents upon arrival in the US, and the construction of the wall at the border between the USA and Mexico), and having two surveys on these issues separated by approximately a year ensures that the answers are not overly contingent upon the immediate news context.

The Australian survey comes from the Australian Voters Experience study (Karp et al., 2018),^v conducted in 2016 by the Electoral Integrity Project (Harvard and Sydney University) in

collaboration with the Australian Election Commission to measure the attitudes of the electorate. The dataset comes from an online three-wave panel survey administered before and after the Australian federal elections of July 2, 2016. Respondents were selected from a representative pool of Australian voters by the polling institute SSI, who conducted the surveys. Data was gathered in three waves, respectively in late June (one week before the election), early July (in the 1-2 weeks after the election), and again in late August/early September (1.5 to 2 months after the election). The initial sample (Wave 1) has 2,139 valid observations, whereas Waves 2 and 3 have respectively 1,838 observations (86% retention) and 1,543 observations (84% retention). Overall, 72% of observations in Wave 1 are still present in Wave 3. The experiment was embedded in the third wave. Randomly selected subsamples of respondents were exposed to one of the following four mock campaign messages: (i) a negative message where Bill Shorten, leader of the main opposition party (Labor), criticized the Liberals' handling of the country's economy; (ii) that same negative message complemented with relevant real-world information (the fact that ratings agency Standard and Poor's lowered Australia's credit rating outlook to negative), (iii) that same real-world information on its own, or (iv) a positive message from Labor.

In the Danish and US surveys, respondents participate in a random order in each of the experimental conditions (three issues in Denmark and two in each of the US studies; see Figures A1-A4 in the on-line appendix for an overview). Each of these experimental conditions has a separate control group (except the second US study). Background information about the respondents in each control and treatment group across the experiments is provided in Table A14-A21 in the on-line appendix. When including these background variables to the analysis, the results do not change substantively (reported in Tables A12-A13 in the on-line appendix). Moreover, the treatment and control groups appear to be balanced as the background variables

are poor predictors of respondents' assignment to the treatment and control groups (see Table A23 in the on-line appendix where the Wald χ^2 tests for model fit are insignificant in seven out of eight cases).

In the hypothesis test, we stack the data from all of the surveys and estimate the OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues in the experiments. The four experiments do not all cover each of the conditions that we use to test the hypotheses. As Figure 1 shows, the experiments in Denmark and Australia and one of the experiments in the US cover almost all conditions. The main exception is that we cannot test information about a negative policy development vs. the control in Denmark. The second experiment in the US adds additional evidence on the key hypotheses, namely negative campaigning vs. position campaigning and campaigning vs. the control. Taking this latter bonus experiment out does not change the results (see Table A8 in the on-line appendix). Importantly, the main results do not change substantially when taking out one issue at a time or testing the hypotheses on one experiment at a time (see Tables A4-A21 in the on-line appendix). Unsurprisingly, the level of statistical significance decreases due to the low number of observations in each sample.

[Figure 1]

Stimuli Material

Like many other experiments on the influence of party communication on voters (Dahlberg and Martinsson 2015; Morisi 2018; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010; Stubager & Seeberg 2016; Walgrave et al., 2009), respondents receive a mock news item as stimuli material in each experimental condition. The news item conveys either (1) a negative message from the sponsor without information about a negative policy development, (2) information about a negative

policy development but no negative message (only in the US), (3) a negative message together with information about a negative policy development (not in Australia), (4) a positive message without information about a negative policy development. The news item is a simple text with no professional layout, and the respondents receive a short intro before the text telling them that they will receive a “a text with statements [...] from leading figures of the [...] party”. Hence, although we cannot strictly control for this, we aim to avoid that the respondents find the source non-credible or unbiased and that this influences their party evaluations.

The negative campaigning message in the mock news items reflects true statements made by Danish and Australian members of parliament and US legislators, and the information about the negative policy development uses true figures and graphs together with policy experts presenting the data (see the questionnaire in sections I-IV in the on-line appendix). As mentioned, the negative campaigning in Denmark comes in connection to a government reform, which is briefly mentioned in the stimuli material. To avoid that it is the government’s legislation that affects the results in Denmark and not the sponsor’s communication, the control group also receives this information about the government reform.

To give an example of a negative message, respondents in the first US study receive a mock news item with a title and a statements in this case by a Republican criticizing the Democrats on health:

“Republicans criticize Democrats for poor performance on the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor, a leading figure from the Republican party recently criticized the Democrats for their poor performance: “Despite the

Democrats' continued promises to end this, many people are still without health insurance and the richest Americans still live much longer than the poorest. The Democrats are simply not doing enough to fight inequality in health conditions and life expectancy. The Democrats do not understand the current issue of healthcare coverage for the poor, and how this affects social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Democrats have proven unable to tackle the problem.”

In the mock news item with a positive message, respondents receive a very similar set up but here, the “Republicans praise their performance on the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor” in the title, and in the statement, the Republican praises his party's efforts and emphasizes their ability to handle the issue.

Importantly for the results of the experiment, the respondents do appear to receive and understand the stimuli – on a 0-1 scale (1 most negative), they rate the negative messages .63-.82 and the positive (1 most positive) .58-.71. This suggests that the stimuli works, but it is not artificially strong (in which case ratings would be closer to 1). They also perceive the information about the negative policy development correctly and agree that the unemployment rate remains at an unchanged high level in Denmark, the use of pesticides in Danish agriculture have increased etc. (see Table A22 in the on-line appendix).

Measures

Each stimuli text ends with the same set of questions on the dependent variable. Respondents evaluate on a ten-point scale (recoded 0-1 where 1 is positive) the issue-handling competence of the sponsor and the target (Social Democrats and Liberals in Denmark, Republicans and

Democrats in the US, Liberals and Conservatives in Australia), respectively, using the following question: “How do you think [party] handle problems on [issue] in [country]?” (0 very poorly, 1 very well, don’t know). The measure reflects the classic issue ownership measure by focusing on a party’s ability to handle problems on an issue (Petrocik 1996; Stubager, 2018). However, it departs from the prevalent question format by not asking respondents to choose a preferred party among the alternatives. Instead, and as in other survey analyses, a continuous measure is adopted to offer more analytical leverage (Dahlberg and Martinsson 2015; Stubager and Seeberg 2016; Walgrave, et al., 2009).

Findings

The test of the four hypotheses in the four experiments is shown in Figures 2-4 where each marker represents a standard OLS regression coefficient that estimates the difference in the mean issue-handling competence score for two groups of respondents – a stimuli group vs. a control group or a stimuli group vs. another stimuli group. The whisker gives a 95 percent confidence interval. If the marker is to the right (left) of the vertical, non-effect zero-line, and the whisker escapes this vertical line, the issue ownership score for the party has increased (decreased) in a statistically significant way.

[Figures 2-4]

In support of hypothesis one, the top-second marker in Figure 2 is solidly to the left of the vertical line suggesting that when voters are exposed to a sponsor’s issue-based negative message towards a target party, the target party’s issue ownership on that specific issue decreases. Yet, the top marker in Figure 2 is almost as far to the left as the top-second marker indicating that a positive message has largely similar effects on the target party’s

issue ownership. The fifth marker from the top confirms that the effect of a negative message is larger than the effect of a positive message, but the difference is not statistically significant. This counters hypothesis two.

Turning to the cocktail of a negative messages and a negative policy development (H4), the top-fourth marker in Figure 2 indicates that when voters are exposed to a sponsor's issue-based negative message towards a target party in conjunction with a negative policy development, the target party's issue ownership on that specific issue decreases. Comparing the top-second and top-fourth markers, the effect of negative messages appears to increase in conjunction with a negative policy development. Yet, the bottom marker reveals that this difference is not statistically significant. This rejects hypothesis 4. Yet, the cocktail with a negative policy development has more power compared to just a negative message. Whereas the effect of a plain negative message does not exceed that of a positive message, a negative message combined with information about a negative policy development has greater impact than a positive message as indicated by the top-sixth marker.^{vi} Insofar as a negative message tends to be tied to a negative policy development, this points to the influence of a sponsor's negative message on a target party's issue ownership.

Our analysis does not allow us to test a positive message accompanied by information about a negative policy development. If such information also amplifies the impact of a positive message, we may exaggerate the greater impact of a negative message compared to a positive message. Yet, based on previous research (Thesen 2013) it appears most likely that a party will try as far as possible to be associate with a positive development and make sure that a negative policy development gets associated with the rival. Hence, a positive message together with information about a negative policy

development might happen but it appears less likely, and this dampens concerns that we are overestimating the impact of negative campaigning.

When voters are exposed only to a negative policy development without accompanying party communication, this does not systematically lower their evaluations of the target party. This is visible from the top-three marker where the whisker crosses the vertical line. However, adding a party's negative message to this information about a negative policy development has the largest impact on the target's issue ownership, and the extra effect of receiving the cocktail with a negative message is statistically significant as revealed by the bottom-second marker.^{vii} This suggests that voters are persuaded by a sponsor's negative message to hold a target party accountable for a negative policy development.

In sum, the results indicate that negative messages are an important tool for a party that seeks to undermine a rival party's issue ownership in the eyes of the voters. Such messages seem to work mostly in concert with a negative policy development. Whereas an attack undermines a target party's issue ownership, the size of the effect should not be exaggerated. The negative-message-negative-policy-development-cocktail decreases voters' evaluations of the target party with five percent points on the 0-1 scale. A five percent change probably rarely changes who owns the issue unequivocally. But if an issue ownership is closely divided between two parties, it can nevertheless make a difference in who has a stronger reputation on the issue and which party is on the way down on the issue. Yet, the more plausible interpretation is perhaps that this is a modest effect in most circumstances. This squares well with existing research, which shows that issue ownership in most cases belongs clearly to either left parties or right parties and is fairly stable over time (Seeberg 2017). That said, it is worth remembering though, that we

study only the one-off effect in an experiment and not the repeated multi-channel communication of a political party. Hence, we most likely underestimate the true effects.

A key follow-up question is if the sponsor is able to make supporters of the target party lower their issue ownership evaluation of the target party. Much work on partisanship and motivated reasoning (e.g., Bisgaard 2015) suggests that this is unlikely, so this would really be a sign that a negative message has power. Importantly, Figure 3 suggests that a sponsor's negative message does not only speak to supporters of the sponsor, but reaches also the supporters of the target party (those that indicate that they will vote for the target party if an election took place tomorrow). The grey markers indicate target party supporters' evaluations of the target party. These are as far to the left of the vertical line as the black markers (for all respondents) if not a little further. Hence, the main take away from Figure 3 is the large degree of overlap of the grey and black markers, which suggests that a negative message hits the heart of the target party.

Lastly, the results do not show backlash effects and therefore lend support to hypothesis three. Whereas information just about a negative policy development undermines the sponsor's issue ownership, negative messaging improves more than depresses voters' evaluations of the sponsor as indicated by the right-of-center top-second marker in Figure 4. Yet, the improvement is not statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, a positive message provides more immediate reasons for voters to improve their evaluations of the sponsor, and the top-maker is further to the right than the top-second marker on a negative message. Interestingly, it seems that the sponsor is able to make the information about the negative policy development a concern for the target party more than the sponsor and the information about a negative policy development no

longer has a negative effect on the sponsor party when accompanied by the sponsor party's negative message.

These results do not change substantively when controlling for a host of confounders (Tables A12-A13 in the on-line appendix), when excluding one issue from the experiments at a time (see Tables A4-A11 in the on-line appendix), or when testing the hypotheses in one country at a time (Tables A14-A21 in the on-line appendix). Hence, our results do not hinge on any one particular issue in our experiments, but applies across our test cases. Across six issues in Denmark, Australia, and the US, the results suggest that a party can use negative campaigning – in particular in conjunction with a negative policy development – to undermine a rival party's issue ownership. Based on recent research (Stubager 2018: 357-358), we would expect to also see an effect if we analyzed associative issue ownership rather than competence issue ownership. This is particularly the case because this study is concerned with the impact of blame and criticism and not party positions or voters' positional agreement with the parties (Lefevere et al. 2017: 125). Yet, research on associative issue ownership indicates that this version is more stable and therefore harder to change (Tresch et al 2013). Hence, the impact might be somewhat weaker.

Conclusion

This study of six issues in Denmark, Australia and the US is among the first to analyze how a party can undermine a rival party's issue ownership. The study indicates, in accordance with our expectations, that a party can use negative messages to undermine a rival party's issue ownership. While this remains just an experiment in which voters are exposed to a carefully crafted message by a party without any debate or counterarguments from the rival party like in

many situations in actual politics, and respondents are asked to assess the parties immediately after the message, it is noteworthy that a party can change voters' evaluations of the rival party through a quite short and simple one-off negative message and even on salient issues on which voters probably already have a fair amount of information. We even see an impact on the issues of rural development and agricultural reform, which featured prominently in Danish politics when the survey was collected. Yet, in an actual political setting, the negative message from the sponsor towards the target party most likely triggers a defense message from the target party or even a counter-attack, and the experiment may therefore exaggerate the actual effect of the initial message. At the same time though, in an actual political setting, the sponsor will most likely not just throw a negative message once but persistently repeat its message through multiple channels of communication during its election campaign which suggests that the experiment underestimates the effect. Hence, even if the experiment revealed only a limited effect of negative campaigning, it might still be electorally consequential in close elections if the negative campaigning concerns highly salient issues.

As the experiment is carried out in the very different settings of Denmark, Australia, and the US, it suggests that the same mechanism might operate in many other political systems as well. Moreover, the analysis does not suggest that the results only apply to certain types of issues, as the study provides evidence on issues on which the target party traditionally holds and does not hold issue ownership as well as on issues on which no party clearly has issue ownership.

As our analysis mainly focused on mainstream parties on the centre-left and centre-right, an important topic for future research is to what extent negative messages are equally useful for a mainstream party to attack a niche party and vice versa. Since niche parties such as environmental or far-right parties mainly have issue ownership on one particular issue, we

anticipate that the theoretical model might need to be developed in order to take such variation into account. Furthermore, more aggressive campaigns have been shown to be particularly likely for more “niche” or “extreme” parties (Nai, 2018). Hence, voters may only respond to the party communication on issues on which the niche party actually has a reputation to be attacked.

Our result is significant to issue ownership research for several important reasons. Contrary to previous issue ownership research on the impact of party communication (Egan, 2013; Tresch et al., 2013; Walgrave et al., 2009), our analysis reveals that there are several communication paths to follow when aiming at a rival party’s issue ownership, namely, negative and positive messages. Moreover, our analysis adds important external validity to previous experimental work on the drivers of issue ownership (Tresch et al., 2013; Walgrave et al., 2009) by locating the hypothesis-testing in a real-world setting using stimuli material reflecting actual statements and true graphs for the information about the policy development. Even with limited clinical control settings, we find an effect. Hence, our study boosts emerging evidence that parties can undermine a rival party’s issue ownership through communication. Bridging previously separate literatures on negative campaigning and issue ownership therefore offers a fertile ground to advance our understanding of the mass-elite linkage.

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
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Figure 1. Overview of the experiments.

		Denmark	US (I)	US (II)	Australia
	POS vs. CONTROL	X	X	X	X
H1/H3	NEG vs. CONTROL	X	X	X	X
	PROBL vs. CONTROL		X		
	NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL	X	X		
H2	NEG vs. POS	X	X	X	X
	NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS	X	X		
	PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL		X		
H4	NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG	X	X		


Note: An “X” means that the experiment covered this condition. “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The Danish experiment is conducted on three issues, the US (I) and (II) experiments are conducted on two issues, and the Australian experiment is conducted on one issue each. For more details, see Figures A1-A4 in the on-line appendix.

Figure 2. Evaluation of the target party.




Note: Figure 2 is based on Table A1 in the on-line appendix. The markers represent standard OLS regression coefficients that each estimates the difference in the mean issue-handling competence score for two groups of respondents. The whiskers give a 95 percent confidence interval. “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is respondents’ evaluations of the target party’s issue-handling competence.

Figure 3. Evaluation of the target party among target supporters.



Note: Figure 3 is based on Table A2 in the on-line appendix. The markers represent standard OLS regression coefficients that each estimates the difference in the mean issue-handling competence score for two groups of respondents. The whiskers give a 95 percent confidence interval. Grey markers and whiskers indicate results only for target supporters. “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is the evaluations of the target party’s issue-handling competence among target supports (grey) and all respondents (black).

Figure 4. Evaluation of the sponsor party.



Note: Figure 4 is based on Table A3 in the on-line appendix. The markers represent standard OLS regression coefficients that each estimates the difference in the mean issue-handling competence score for two groups of respondents. The whiskers give a 95 percent confidence interval. “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is respondents’ evaluations of the sponsor party’s issue-handling competence.

ON-LINE APPENDIX

In this on-line appendix, we provide extra analysis in section I, the full questionnaires in Denmark, the US, and Australia in sections II-IV, respectively, and in section V, we provide an overview of experiments and the randomization of respondents in Figures A1-A4, an overview of the respondents across stimuli and control groups in terms of background variables in Tables A14-A21, and a manipulation check in Table A22.

Section I – extra analysis

In Tables A1-A3, we provide the regression models on which Figures 1-3 in the manuscript are based. In Tables A4-A11, we take each of the analysis (in the rows) in Table A1, and rerun the analysis when excluding one issue at a time across the experiments. Hence, we rule out that our results hinge on any one issue in our experiments. In Tables A12-A13, we rerun Tables A1 and A3 when controlling for a number of important background variables. This shows that our control and treatment groups were balanced in the sense that other factors than the treatment do not account for differences between the groups.

Table A1. Evaluation of target party.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
POS vs. CONTROL	-0.02** (0.01)							
NEG vs. CONTROL		-0.04*** (0.01)						
PROBL vs. CONTROL			-0.01 (0.02)					
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL				-0.05*** (0.01)				
NEG vs. POS					-0.01 (0.01)			
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS						-0.02** (0.01)		
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL							-0.03** (0.02)	
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG								-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.55*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.57*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.01)
Obs.	3205	3229	1223	3145	4048	3080	1206	3104

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, + $p < .154$ (two way). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is respondents’ evaluations of the target party’s issue-handling competence.

Table A2. Evaluation of target party among target supporters.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
POS vs. CONTROL	-0.04*** (0.01)							
NEG vs. CONTROL		-0.04*** (0.02)						
PROBL vs. CONTROL			-0.04 (0.02)					
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL				-0.01 (0.01)				
NEG vs. POS					-0.07*** (0.01)			
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS						-0.03* (0.02)		
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL							-0.07*** (0.01)	
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG								-0.03* (0.02)
Constant	0.70*** (0.02)	0.69*** (0.02)	0.74*** (0.02)	0.63*** (0.02)	0.69*** (0.02)	0.63*** (0.02)	0.69*** (0.02)	0.61*** (0.02)
Obs.	1364	1362	469	1598	1335	1271	1335	1269

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is the evaluations of the target party’s issue-handling competence among target supporters.

Table A3. Evaluation of sponsor party.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
POS vs. CONTROL	0.02** (0.01)							
NEG vs. CONTROL		0.01 (0.01)						
PROBL vs. CONTROL			-0.03* (0.02)					
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL				0.00 (0.01)				
NEG vs. POS					-0.02** (0.01)			
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS						-0.02** (0.01)		
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL							0.03** (0.02)	
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG								-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.28*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.35*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.01)
Obs.	3049	3067	1220	2970	3969	2991	1206	3009

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is respondents’ evaluations of the sponsor party’s issue-handling competence.

Table A4. Evaluation of target party. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
POS vs. CONTROL	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Constant	0.35*** (0.01)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.02)
Obs.	2814	2814	2508	2559	2574	2756
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Unem. (DK)	Agri. (DK)	Rural (DK)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). The dependent variable is respondents' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence. "POS" refers to positive campaigning.

Table A5. Evaluation of target party. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
NEG vs. CONTROL	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	0.34*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)
Obs.	2844	2845	2535	2585	2549	2787
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Unem. (DK)	Agri. (DK)	Rural (DK)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). The dependent variable is respondents' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence. "NEG" refers to negative campaigning.

Table A6. Evaluation of target party. Problems vs. control. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROBL vs. CONTROL	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Constant	0.36*** (0.02)	0.58*** (0.02)	0.57*** (0.02)
Obs.	839	844	763
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A7. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. control. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Constant	0.35*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)
Obs.	2763	2758	2470	2517	2518	2699
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Unem. (DK)	Agri. (DK)	Rural (DK)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way) (two way). “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A8. Evaluation of target party. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
NEG vs. POS	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 ⁺ (0.01)	-0.01 ⁺ (0.01)	-0.02 [*] (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 ⁺⁺ (0.01)
Constant	0.45 ^{***} (0.01)	0.50 ^{***} (0.02)	0.50 ^{***} (0.01)	0.51 ^{***} (0.01)	0.51 ^{***} (0.02)	0.51 ^{***} (0.02)	0.50 ^{***} (0.01)	0.51 ^{***} (0.01)
Obs.	3660	3659	3377	3412	3401	3615	3601	3611
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Unem. (DK)	Agri. (DK)	Rural (DK)	Econ. (AUS)	Health 2 (US)	Immi. 2 (US)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. ⁺ $p < .17$, ⁺⁺ $p < .12$ (two way). The dependent variable is respondents' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence. "POS" refers to positive campaigning; "NEG" refers to negative campaigning.

Table A9. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. positive message. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Constant	0.33*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.01)	0.50*** (0.01)	0.51*** (0.01)	0.51*** (0.01)
Obs.	2695	2688	2428	2460	2486	2643
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Unem. (DK)	Agri. (DK)	Rural (DK)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A10. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. problems. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Constant	0.46*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.02)
Obs.	828	826	758
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “Problems” and “p” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A11. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. negative campaigning. One case excluded at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Constant	0.47*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)
Obs.	2725	2719	2455	2486	2461	2674
Excluded case	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Unem. (DK)	Agri. (DK)	Rural (DK)	Econ. (AUS)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “Negative” and “NC” refers to negative campaigning, and “Problems” and “p” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A12. Evaluation of target party with control variables included.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
POS vs. CONTROL	-0.02*** (0.01)							
NEG vs. CONTROL		-0.04*** (0.01)						
PROBL vs. CONTROL			-0.02 (0.01)					
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL				-0.04*** (0.01)				
NEG vs. POS					-0.01+ (0.01)			
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS						-0.02** (0.01)		
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL							-0.04*** (0.01)	
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG								-0.01 (0.01)
Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.04** (0.02)
Gender	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Opinion	0.21*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.19*** (0.02)
Target supporter	0.20*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.24*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.01)
Constant	0.37*** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.02)	0.37*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)
Obs.	2798	2807	1119	2720	3609	2648	1097	2657

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, + $p < .21$ (two way). For Denmark and the first US study, the opinion variable uses an issue-specific opinion. For Australia and the second US study, the opinion variable uses left-right self-placement (see Table A14). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is the evaluations of the target party’s issue-handling competence among target supporters.

Table A13. Evaluation of sponsor party with control variables included.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
POS vs. CONTROL	0.02** (0.01)							
NEG vs. CONTROL		0.01 (0.01)						
PROBL vs. CONTROL			-0.01 (0.01)					
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL				-0.00 (0.01)				
NEG vs. POS					-0.02** (0.01)			
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS						-0.02** (0.01)		
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL							0.03* (0.02)	
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG								-0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Gender	0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Opinion	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Target supporter	-0.21*** (0.01)	-0.21*** (0.01)	-0.25*** (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.01)	-0.21*** (0.01)	-0.20*** (0.01)	-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.01)
Constant	0.45*** (0.02)	0.46*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)	0.50*** (0.02)	0.51*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.51*** (0.02)
Obs.	2678	2687	1117	2590	3552	2584	1096	2593

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). For Denmark and the first US study, the opinion variable uses an issue-specific opinion. For Australia and the second US study, the opinion variable uses left-right self-placement (see Table A14). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. The dependent variable is the evaluations of the sponsor party’s issue-handling competence among target supporters.

Table A14. Evaluation of target party. Positive message vs control. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
POS vs. CONTROL	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	0.35*** (0.01)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.02)
Obs.	2814	2814	2508
Included country	US (I)	Denmark	Australia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). The dependent variable is respondents' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence. "POS" refers to positive campaigning.

Table A15. Evaluation of target party. Negative message vs control. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
NEG vs. CONTROL	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)
Constant	0.56*** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.02)
Obs.	769	2018	442
Included country	US (I)	Denmark	Australia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). The dependent variable is respondents' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence. "NEG" refers to negative campaigning.

Table A16. Evaluation of target party. Problems vs. Control. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)
PROBL vs. CONTROL	0.01	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.57***	0.48***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Obs.	763	460
Included country	US (I)	Australia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A17. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. control. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
NEG (with PROBL) vs. CONTROL	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)
Constant	0.55*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.01)	0.48*** (0.02)
Obs.	769	1930	446
Included country	US (I)	Denmark	Australia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way) (two way). “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A18. Evaluation of target party. Negative message vs. positive message. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NEG vs. POS	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Constant	0.52*** (0.02)	0.37*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.02)
Obs.	777	1954	433	884
Included country	US (I)	Denmark	Australia	US (II)

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. + $p < .17$, ++ $p < .12$ (two way). The dependent variable is respondents' evaluations of the target party's issue-handling competence. "POS" refers to positive campaigning; "NEG" refers to negative campaigning.

Table A19. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. positive message. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
NEG (with PROBL) vs. POS	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)
Constant	0.51*** (0.02)	0.38*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.02)
Obs.	777	1866	437
Included country	US (I)	Denmark	Australia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A20. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. problems. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(3)
PROBL (with NEG) vs. PROBL	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Constant	0.56*** (0.02)	0.44*** (0.02)
Obs.	758	448
Included country	US (I)	Australia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Table A21. Evaluation of target party. Negative message together with problems vs. negative message. One country included at a time.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
NEG (with PROBL) vs. NEG	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Constant	0.47*** (0.02)	0.37*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.02)
Obs.	764	1910	430
Included country	US (I)	Den- mark	Austra- lia

Note: OLS regression models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems.

Section II – Danish study

In Section II, we report a translated version of the Danish questionnaire for the Danish study.

You will now receive a number of questions about how you think political parties handle various problems in society.

Control group for the three experiments

(in randomized order)

KA_K1_resp. Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. The Liberal government retrenched the right to unemployment benefits in 2015 to get more people into employment. How good are the Social Democrats at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

KA_K2_resp. Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. In its agricultural reform in 2016, the Liberal government limited the pesticide ground restrictions near fresh water streams and lakes for farmers and increased the norms for farmers' use of pesticides. How good are the Social Democrats at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

KA_K3_resp. Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. The Liberal government liberalized the rural district code in 2016 to generate economic growth in rural parts of Denmark. How good are the Social Democrats at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

KB_K4_resp. Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. The Liberal government retrenched the right to unemployment benefits in 2015 to get more people into employment. How good are the Liberals at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

KB_K5_resp. Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. In its agricultural reform in 2016, the Liberal government limited the pesticide ground restrictions near fresh water streams and lakes for farmers and increased the norms for farmers' use of pesticides. How good are the Liberals at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

KB_K6_resp. Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. The Liberal government liberalized the rural district code in 2016 to generate economic growth in rural parts of Denmark. How good are the Liberals at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

Experiment 1: Unemployment benefits

S1. Negative message without information about real-world development

“The Social Democrats severely criticize the liberal government for its handling of job creation”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government retrenched the right to unemployment benefits in 2015 to get more people into employment, the Social Democrats were very critical of its handling of the issue. A Social Democratic MP said the following: “The result is crystal clear: The reform has devastating consequences but only minimal effects on employment. It affects some of the most vulnerable groups of society. Handicapped couples on unemployment benefits lose about half of their entitlement, while 34,500 children will grow up in worse conditions. It is outrageous. Now we know the Liberals again”.

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E1_S1_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats’ criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Social Democrats at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don’t know)?

E1_S1_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats’ criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Liberals at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don’t know)?


E1_S1_Q3. To what degree did you find the Social Democrats’ comment to the Liberals’ policy to be negative? (0 not at all negative; 10 highly negative, don’t know)?

S2. Negative message with information about real-world development

“Unchanged high unemployment, and the Social Democrats severely criticize the liberal government”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government retrenched the right to unemployment benefits in 2015 to get more people into employment, the Social Democrats were very critical of its handling of the issue. A Social Democratic MP said the following: “The result is crystal clear: The reform has devastating consequences but only minimal effects on employment. It affects some of the most vulnerable groups of society. Handicapped couples on unemployment benefits lose about half of their entitlement, while 34,500 children will grow up in worse conditions. It is outrageous. Now we know the Liberals again”.

This takes place while the unemployment rate continues to remain at the same high level it reached amidst the financial crisis in 2008 according to figures from the Danish Statistical Bureau. See the figure below. At the same time, a leading economist from Aarhus University warns that “you easily overestimate the job creation trend. The unemployment rate is in reality higher than the current figures indicate because the unemployed have not found a job. They have just left the statistics”.



Source: Danish Statistical Bureau

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E1_S2_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats’ criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Social democrats at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don’t know)?

E1_S2_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats’ criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Liberals at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don’t know)?

E1_S2_Q3. Do you think the unemployment rate is decreasing, the same, or increasing? (1 decreasing; 2 the same; 3 increasing, don’t know)?

E1_S2_Q4. To what degree did you find the Social Democrats’ comment to the Liberals policy to be negative? (0 not at all negative; 10 highly negative, don’t know)?

S3. Positive message without information about real-world development

“The Social Democrats’ plan for job creation”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government retrenched the right to unemployment benefits in 2015 to get more people into employment, a Social Democratic MP said the following: “The Social Democrats aim to make it more attractive to be employed. We need to constantly reevaluate if we can do better to make it more profitable to take up a low-income position than apply for benefits. At the same time, the Social Democrats seek to ensure protection and security for those that end up in unemployment”.

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E1_S3_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats' own plan, how good are the Social Democrats at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E1_S3_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats' own plan, how good are the Liberals at handling job creation? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E1_S3_Q3. To what extent do you think the Social Democrats' message concerns the qualities of their own policy? (0 does not concern the Social Democrats' own policy at all; 10 concerns the Social Democrats' own policy a great deal, don't know)?

Experiment 2: The agricultural reform

S1. Negative message without information about real-world development

“The Social Democrats severely criticize the liberal government for its handling of agricultural use of pesticides”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government in its agricultural reform in 2016 limited the pesticide ground restrictions near fresh water streams and lakes for farmers and increased the norms for farmers' use of pesticides, the Social Democrats were very critical of its handling of the issue. A Social Democratic MP said the following: “The government is slaughtering the Danish nature. The agricultural reform is a catastrophe for the environment, and the consequences are huge. This is especially the case after the depletion of nitrogen, and hence, deoxygenation in fresh water streams and lakes will increase. It is a sad day for the environmentally-renowned Denmark. Unfortunately, the government has not accomplished to make a broad political compromise. It is stupid, to put it bluntly, to trash the green lead that Denmark enjoys internationally when Danish agricultural production has so much to offer in terms of a green turn”.

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E2_S1_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats' criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Social Democrats at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E2_S1_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrat's criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Liberals at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?


E2_S1_Q3. To what degree did you find the Social Democrats' comment to the Liberals' policy to be negative? (0 not at all negative; 10 highly negative, don't know)?

S2. Negative message with information about real-world development

“Increased agricultural use of pesticides and the Social Democrats severely criticize the liberal government”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government in its agricultural reform in 2016 limited the pesticide ground restrictions near fresh water streams and lakes for farmers and increased the norms for farmers' use of pesticides, the Social Democrats were very critical of its handling of the issue. A Social Democratic MP said the following: “The government is slaughtering the Danish nature. The agricultural reform is a catastrophe for the environment, and the consequences are huge. This is especially the case after the depletion of nitrogen, and hence, deoxygenation in fresh water streams and lakes will increase. It is a sad day for the environmentally-renowned Denmark. Unfortunately, the government has not accomplished to make a broad political compromise. It is stupid, to put it bluntly, to trash the green lead that Denmark enjoys internationally when Danish agricultural production has so much to offer in terms of a green turn”.

This takes places while agricultural use of pesticides has increased by 20 percent since 2006 according to figures from the Danish Statistical Bureau. See the figure below. As a leading expert in the field puts it: “The sale of pesticides to agricultural production just keeps growing”. In regard to the agricultural reform, a professor at Aarhus University adds that “the analysis and impact assessment that the Liberal government and its civil servants have applied are recklessly misleading. It makes the agricultural reform appear as a gift to the nature. I wish the government had been more honest and remained transparent on the environmental costs”. In sum, the professor estimates that the reform leaves the environment worse off.



(new page – questions in randomized order)

E2_S2_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats' criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Social Democrats at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E2_S2_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats' criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Liberals at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E2_S2_Q3. Do you think the development in agricultural use of pesticides is decreasing, the same, or increasing? (1 decreasing; 2 the same; 3 increasing, don't know)?

E2_S2_Q4. To what degree did you find the Social Democrats' comment to the Liberals policy to be negative? (0 not at all negative; 10 highly negative, don't know)?

S3. Positive message without information about real-world development

“The Social Democrats' plan for striking the right balance between environmental concern and agricultural interest”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government in its agricultural reform in 2016 limited the pesticide ground restrictions near fresh water streams and lakes for farmers and increased the norms for farmers' use of pesticides, a Social Democratic MP said the following: “We aim for an ambitious climate and energy policy. The Social Democrats will look after the environment, the nature, and the climate so that our kids will grow up in a world less polluted and more environmentally sustainable. We are prepared to create jobs and generate growth, but we think that it should not take place at the expense of environmental concerns”.

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E2_S3_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats' plan for striking the right balance between environmental concern and agricultural interest, how good are the Social Democrats at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E2_S3_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats' plan for striking the right balance between environmental concern and agricultural interest, how good are the Liberals at striking the right balance between environmental concerns and agricultural production? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E2_S3_Q2. To what extent do you think the Social Democrats' message concerns the qualities of their own policy? (0 does not concern the Social Democrats' own policy at all; 10 concerns the Social Democrats' own policy a great deal, don't know)?

Experiment 3: The district planning code

S1. Negative message without information about real-world development

“The Social Democrats severely criticize the liberal government for its handling of slow economic growth in rural parts of Denmark”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government liberalized the rural district code in 2016 to generate economic growth in rural parts of Denmark, the Social Democrats were very critical of its handling of the issue. A Social Democratic MP said the following: “The Liberal government aims for a very far-reaching liberalization of the rural district code with severe consequences for our coastline, remote beaches, and local communities. The government is losing its mind, and the Liberals have absolutely no visions for ensuring a Danish society in balance with solid growth in every part of the country”.

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E3_S1_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats' criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Social Democrats at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E3_S1_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats' criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Liberals at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E3_S1_Q3. To what degree did you find the Social Democrats' comment to the Liberals' policy to be negative? (0 not at all negative; 10 highly negative, don't know)?

S2. Negative message with information about real-world development


“Employment in rural parts of Denmark is lacking behind, and the Social Democrats severely criticize the liberal government”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government liberalized the rural district code in 2016 to generate economic growth in rural parts of Denmark, the Social Democrats were very critical of its handling of the issue. A Social

Democratic MP said the following: “The Liberal government aims for a very far-reaching liberalization of the rural district code with severe consequences for our coastline, remote beaches, and local communities. The government is losing its mind, and the Liberals have absolutely no visions for ensuring a Danish society in balance with solid growth in every part of the country”.

This takes place while employment in rural districts cannot keep track with the rate in urban areas according to figures from the Danish Statistical Bureau. See the figure below. A scientist from CBS comments on this development and the reform of the rural district code: “The rural parts of Denmark are in desperate need of economic growth and employment opportunities, and the change to the rural district code is far from sufficient to get that far. The government’s reform fails!” Another researcher at Aalborg University adds the following: “The existing rural district code is not the problem. The lack of growth is. Instead of providing this, the reform undermines our beautiful, preserved nature in these rural areas of Denmark”.

Gennemsnitlig årlig vækst i beskæftigelsen fordelt på landsdele, 1995-2013



(new page – questions in randomized order)

E3_S2_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats’ criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Social Democrats at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don’t know)?

E3_S2_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats’ criticism of the Liberal government, how good are the Liberals at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don’t know)?

E3_S2_Q3. Do you think the employment rate in the rural districts of Denmark can keep up with the employment rate in larger cities in Denmark (0 not at all, 5 to a large extent, don't know)?

E3_S2_Q4. To what degree did you find the Social Democrats' comment to the Liberals' policy to be negative? (0 not at all negative; 10 highly negative, don't know)?

S3. Positive message without information about real-world development

“The Social Democrats' plan for economic growth in rural parts of Denmark”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle political problems. When the Liberal government liberalized the rural district code in 2016 to generate economic growth in rural parts of Denmark, a Social Democratic MP said the following: “We have amazing rural districts with a huge potential. We need to take advantage of that. We need to be better at avoiding that Denmark splits in two. We aim to make it cheaper and easier to start up a company in these districts. It is pivotal for the Social Democrats that we protect our distinct coastal lines. Future tourism relies on this reserve. We should not transform the west coast of Denmark to a new Mallorca”.

(new page – questions in randomized order)

E3_S3_Q1. Against the background of the Social Democrats' plan for economic growth in rural parts of Denmark, how good are the Social Democrats at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E3_S3_Q2. Against the background of the Social Democrats' plan for economic growth in rural parts of Denmark, how good are the Liberals at generating growth in the rural districts of Denmark? (0 very bad; 10 very good, don't know)?

E3_S3_Q3. To what extent do you think the Social Democrats' message concerns the qualities of their own policy? (0 does not concern the Social Democrats' own policy at all; 10 concerns the Social Democrats' own policy a great deal, don't know)?

All respondents answer these questions:

Q9. Hobbies are an important part of most people's identity, and research shows that hobbies increase the feeling of quality of life and the feeling of satisfaction. For the quality of this survey, it is important that you read all instructions and information carefully before answering any questions. When you read the text, you have some time to consider your answer. To show us that you read all information, we kindly ask you to tick the “other” box below and write “I read the text” in the open-ended entry line. Do not pick any hobbies from the list. We know that it can be

time-consuming and demanding to read through large amounts of text, and we greatly appreciate your efforts. Which hobbies do you have? Please choose several.

Q10. To what extent is Danish politics characterized by disagreement between the political parties on political questions? (0 very little; 10 a great deal, don't know)

Q11. To what extent is Danish politics characterized by political parties' attacks on each other's problem-solving competences? (0 very little; 10 a great deal, don't know)

Q12. To what extent do you think that Danish politicians speak in an uncivilized manner about each other's competences and qualities? (0 very little; 10 a great deal, don't know)

Section III - US study (I)

In Section III, we report the questionnaire for the US (I) study.

Experiment 1

You will now receive some questions about healthcare coverage for the poor.

Control.

DV1_E1_S0 Which party is most competent at handling healthcare coverage for the poor?
Republican, Democrat, equal, Don't know.

DV2_E1_S0 How do you think the Democrats and the Republicans handle healthcare coverage for the poor?

On the next page, you will receive a text with statements about access to health care for the poor from leading figures of the Republican or Democratic parties. Read it carefully as you will receive a number of question to answer following the text.

Stimuli 1

“Republicans criticize Democrats for poor performance on the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor, a leading figure from the Republican party recently criticized the Democrats for their poor performance: “Despite the Democrats’ continued promises to end this, many people are still without health insurance and the richest Americans still live much longer than the poorest. The Democrats are simply not doing enough to fight inequality in health conditions and life expectancy. The Democrats do not understand the current issue of healthcare coverage for the poor, and how this affects social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Democrats have proven unable to tackle the problem.”

DV1_E1_S0.

DV2_E1_S0.

E1_S1_D1. How would you describe the statement? Highly negative, highly positive, both, don't know.

Stimuli 2


“The rich live much longer than the poor and Republicans criticize Democrats for poor performance on the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor.”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. Differences in the life expectancy of the rich and the poor in the US are an increasing problem according to a recent study by a Stanford lab: From 2001-2014, the difference between the richest and poorest five percent has increased by three years in the US so that the poorest men today live 73 years while the richest live 87 years (see the blue line in the figure below).

This has made a leading figure from the Republican party recently criticize the Democrats for their poor performance on the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor: “Despite the Democrats’ continued promises to end this, many people are still without health insurance and the richest Americans still live much longer than the poorest. The Democrats are simply not doing enough to fight inequality in health conditions and life expectancy. The Democrats do not understand the

current issue of healthcare coverage for the poor, and how this affects social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Democrats have proven unable to tackle the problem.”

Life expectancy across household incomes in the US, averages for 2001-2014



Source: Chetty et al.,(2016). “The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014”. JAMA. 315(16): 1750-1766.

DV1_E1_S0.

DV2_E1_S0.

E1_S1_D1.

E1_S1_D2. Again, thinking about the information just provided, to what extent do you think that the richest Americans lives longer than the poorest? “Much longer than the poor”, “about the same”, “much shorter than the poor”, don’t know.

Stimuli 3.

“Republicans praise their performance on the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor”
Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor, a leading figure from the Republican party recently praised the party’s efforts to fight inequality in health conditions and life expectancy: “Many people are still without health insurance and the richest Americans still live much longer than the poorest, but we know how to handle the issue of healthcare coverage for the poor. In contrast to the Democrats, we

have a solid understanding of how this affects social relations and economic prospects in the US. We are able to tackle the problem.”

DV1_E1_S0.

DV2_E1_S0.


E1_S1_D1.

Stimuli 4.

“The rich lives much longer than the poor”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. Differences in the life expectancy of the rich and the poor in the US are an increasing problem according to a recent study by a Stanford lab: From 2001-2014, the difference between the richest and poorest five percent has increased by three years in the US so that the poorest men today live 73 years while the richest live 87 years (see the blue line in the figure below).

Life expectancy across household incomes in the US, averages for 2001-2014



Source: Chetty et al., (2016). “The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014”. JAMA. 315(16): 1750-1766.

DV1_E1_S0.

DV2_E1_S0.

E1_S4_D2.

Experiment 2.

You will now receive some questions about immigration from Mexico.

DV1_E2_S0 Which party is most competent at handling immigration from Mexico? Republican, Democrat, equal, Don't know

DV2_E2_S0 How do you think the Democrats and the Republicans handle immigration from Mexico?

Stimuli 1

“Democrats criticize Republicans for poor performance on the issue of Mexican immigration”.

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of immigration, a leading figure from the Democratic party recently criticized the Republicans for their poor performance: “Despite the Republicans’ continued promises to end this, immigration from Mexico has not gone down. The Republicans do not understand the current issue of Mexican immigration to the US, and how it connects to social networks and economic prospects in Mexico and the US. The Republicans have simply proven unable to tackle Mexican immigration.”

DV1_E2_S0.

DV2_E2_S0.

E2_S1_D1. Again, thinking about the information just provided, how would you describe the statement by the Democrats about the Republicans? Highly negative, highly positive, both, don't know.

Stimuli 2


“Democrats criticize Republicans for poor performance on the issue of Mexican immigration as the rate is still at a record high and rising”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. After more than ten years, immigration from Mexico to the US is still at a record high at about 160,000 Mexican immigrants per year and is even rising according to recent figures from the independent think tank, “Migration Policy Institute”. See the development in the figure below.

This has made a leading figure from the Democratic party recently criticize the Republicans for their poor performance: “Despite the Republicans’ continued promises to end this, immigration

from Mexico has not gone down. The Republicans do not understand the current issue of Mexican immigration to the US, and how it connects to social networks and economic prospects in Mexico and the US. The Republicans have simply proven unable to tackle Mexican immigration.”

Immigration from Mexico to the US, 2003-2015



Source: Migration Policy Institute.

DV1_E2_S0.

DV2_E2_S0.

E2_S1_D1.

E2_S2_D2. And how would you describe the development in immigration from Mexico to the US? Decreasing a lot, neither nor, increasing a lot, don't know.

Stimuli 3

“Democrats praise their performance on the issue of Mexican immigration”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of immigration, a leading figure from the Democratic party recently praised the party's efforts to bring down Mexican immigration: “Immigration from Mexico has still not gone down, but we know how to handle the issue of immigration. In contrast to the Republicans, we have a solid understanding of

the current issue of Mexican immigration to the US, and how it connects to social networks and economic prospects in Mexico and the US. We are able to tackle the problem.”

DV1_E2_S0.

DV2_E2_S0.


E2_S1_D1.

Stimuli 4

“Mexican immigration is still at a record high and rising”

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. After more than ten years, immigration from Mexico to the US is still at a record high at about 160,000 Mexican immigrants per year and is even rising according to recent figures from the independent think tank, “Migration Policy Institute”. See the development in the figure below.

Immigration from Mexico to the US, 2003-2015



Source: Migration Policy Institute.

DV1_E2_S0.

DV2_E2_S0.

E2_S2_D2.

Thank you for your participation! It will help us to better understand how voters think about parties and politics. The messages you have received from leading figures from the Republican and Democratic party are fictitious but generally reflect communication from the parties in recent years.

Section IV – US Study (II)

In Section IV, we report the questionnaire for the US (II) study.

On the next page, you will receive a text with statements about access to health care for the poor from leading figures of the Republican or Democratic parties. Read it carefully as you will receive a number of question to answer following the text.

Experiment 1

Stimuli 1

"Republicans defend their record on health care"

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of access to health care for the poor, a leading figure from the Republican party recently commented on the issue: "In the past, many people were without health insurance and the poorest Americans lived much less than the richest. The Republicans are committed to fight inequality in health conditions and life expectancy. A new series of measures towards universal health care proposed by the Republicans will greatly improve social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Republicans have proven competent to tackle the problem. Trust us."

Q33 Thinking of the message you just read, please indicate the extent to which the message was negative. 1 disagree, 7 agree.

Q34 How competent do you think that the following parties are to handle access to health care for the poor? Republicans, Democrats. Please answer on a scale from 0 "very incompetent" to 10 "very competent".

Stimuli 2

"Republicans criticize Democrats for incompetence"

Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of access to health care for the poor, a leading figure from the Republican party recently criticized the Democrats for their poor performance: "Despite the Democrats continued promises to end this, many people are still without health insurance and the poorest Americans still live much less than the richest. The Democrats are simply not doing enough to fight inequality in health conditions and life expectancy. The Democrats do not understand the current issue of access to

health care for the poor, and how this affects social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Democrats have proven incompetent to tackle the problem. Do not trust them.”

Q33, Q34

Experiment 2

Stimuli 1

"Democrats defend their record on immigration" Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of illegal immigration, a leading figure from the Democratic party recently commented on the issue: “In the past, illegal immigration to the US was reaching very high levels. The Democrats are committed to curb illegal immigration. A new series of measures for better border controls proposed by the Democrats will greatly improve social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Democrats have proven competent to tackle the problem. Trust us.”

Q33, Q34

Stimuli 2

"Democrats criticize Republicans for incompetence" Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle problems. On the issue of illegal immigration, a leading figure from the Democratic party recently criticized the Republicans for their poor performance: “Despite the Republicans continued promises to end this, illegal immigration to the US is not slowing down. The Republicans do not understand the current issue of illegal immigration to the US, and how this affects social relations and economic prospects in the US. The Republicans have proven incompetent to tackle the problem. Do not trust them.”

Q33, Q34

Section V – Australian Study

In Section V, we report the questionnaire for the Australian study.

Note: all variables measured in wave 3

Control

Q48 Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle an issue. How good or bad do you think that the Liberals and Labor are at handling the economy of this country? Please provide an answer from 0 "very bad" to 10 "very good"

Q48_1: Evaluate the Liberals

Q48_2: Evaluate the Labor party

Stimuli 1. Negative

Q49 Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle an issue. During the campaign, Labor party's leader Bill Shorten claimed that the Liberals' "cuts in education spending and family tax benefits would hurt the economy". How good or bad do you think that the two parties are at handling the economy of this country? Please provide an answer from 0 "very bad" to 10 "very good".

Q49_1: Evaluate the Liberals

Q49_2: Evaluate the Labor party

Stimuli 2. Negative with real world problem

Q50 Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle an issue. During the campaign, Labor party's leader Bill Shorten claimed that the Liberals' "cuts in education spending and family tax benefits would hurt the economy". This criticism comes as ratings agency Standard and Poor's lowered Australia's credit rating outlook to negative. How good or bad do you think that the two parties are at handling the economy of this country? Please provide an answer from 0 "very bad" to 10 "very good".

Q50_1: Evaluate the Liberals

Q50_2: Evaluate the Labor party

Stimuli 3. Real world problem only

Q50a Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle an issue. Recently, ratings agency Standard and Poor's lowered Australia's credit rating outlook to negative. How good or bad do you think that the two parties are at handling the economy of this country? Please provide an answer from 0 "very bad" to 10 "very good".

Q50a_1: Evaluate the Liberals

Q50a_2: Evaluate the Labor party

Stimuli 4. Positive

Q50b Political parties are often evaluated on how they handle an issue. During the campaign, Labor party's leader Bill Shorten claimed that Labor "will level the playing field for first home buyers, make multinationals pay their fair share, and help small businesses succeed in a competitive global economy". How good or bad do you think that the two parties are at handling the economy of this country? Please provide an answer from 0 "very bad" to 10 "very good".

Q50b_1: Evaluate the Liberals

Q50b_2: Evaluate the Labor party

Section VI

In this section VI, we provide an overview of the randomization in each of the experiments in Figures A1-A4. Moreover, we show in Tables A14-A21 and in Tables A22 that the control and treatment groups overall across each of the experiments differ to a very limited extent on the respondents' background variables, and in Table A22 these variables do not predict respondents' assignment to control and treatment groups. This assures us of the balance of the control and treatment groups and assures us that the randomization has worked.

Figure A1. Overview of the randomization in the Danish experiments. Total N = 1,513.

<p>Experiment 1: Unemployment benefits</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 334)</p> <p>S2: Negative campaigning with real-world problem information (N = 315)</p> <p>S3: Positive campaigning (N = 337)</p>	<p>Control group</p> <p>(N = 360)</p>
<p>Experiment 2: Agriculture</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 317)</p> <p>S2: Negative campaigning with real-world problem information (N = 301)</p> <p>S3: Positive campaigning (N = 319)</p>	<p>(N = 327)</p>
<p>Experiment 3: Rural development</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 348)</p> <p>S2: Negative campaigning with real-world problem information (N = 295)</p> <p>S3: Positive campaigning (N = 299)</p>	<p>(N = 332)</p>

Note: For each respondent, the order of experiments 1 to 3 was randomized. In each experiment, respondents in the stimuli group were randomly allocated to stimuli type S1, S2, or S3.

Figure A2. Overview of the randomization in the US experiments (I). Total N = 1310

<p style="text-align: center;">Experiment 1: Health</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 192)</p> <p>S2: Negative campaigning with real-world problem information (N = 188)</p> <p>S3: Positive campaigning (N = 198)</p> <p>S4: Real-world problem information (N = 190)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Control group</p> <p>(N = 195)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Experiment 2: Immigration</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 191)</p> <p>S2: Negative campaigning with real-world problem information (N = 195)</p> <p>S3: Positive campaigning (N = 199)</p> <p>S4: Real-world problem information (N = 188)</p>	<p>(N = 195)</p>

Note: For each respondent, the order of experiments 1 and 2 was randomized. In each experiment, respondents in the stimuli group were randomly allocated to stimuli types S1-S4.

Figure A3. Overview of the randomization in the US experiments (II). Total N =1800.

<p style="text-align: center;">Experiment 1: Health</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 225)</p> <p>S2: Positive campaigning (N = 222)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Experiment 2: Immigration</p> <p>S1: Negative campaigning (N = 217)</p> <p>S2: Positive campaigning (N = 220)</p>

Note: For each respondent, the order of experiments 1 and 2 was randomized. In each experiment, respondents in the stimuli group were randomly allocated to stimuli type S1 and S2.

Figure A4. Overview of the randomization in the Australian experiments (I). Total N =1543.

Experiment 1: Economy	Control group
S1: Negative campaigning (N = 213)	(N = 229)
S2: Negative campaigning with real-world problem information (N = 217)	
S3: Positive campaigning (N = 220)	
S4: Real-world problem information (N = 231)	

Note: In the experiment, respondents were randomly allocated to the stimuli group and the control group. Respondents in the stimuli group were randomly allocated to stimuli types S1-S4.

Table A14. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of unemployment in Denmark.

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG W/ PROBL	CONTROL
Age	51.3	52.2	-	52.4	51.6
Gender (pct. male)	48.5	48.7	-	49.2	53.1
Vote (pct. rightwing)	50.2	56.0	-	50.8	55.5
News consumption	.84	.86	-	.88	.87
Political interest	-	-	-	-	-
Most important problem	.68	.68	-	.70	.65
Opinion	.33	.33	-	.31	.30
Left-right self-placement	-	-	-	-	-

Note: “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. News consumption, political interest, most important problem, opinion, left-right, and self-placement are measured on a 0-1 scale where 1 is maximum news consumption, political interest, concern with an issue, and most right on the opinion or left-right self-placement. In Denmark, the opinion variable asks: “I will now give you some opinions from the political debate to which you can either agree (=0) or disagree (=10): (1) The rights to unemployment benefits should be limited; (2) Farmers should be allowed to increase the use of pesticides; (3) Building a hotel, restaurant, or facilities for a company in coastal areas should be made easier. In the first US study the opinion variable asks: “Do you think that it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure poor people have healthcare coverage, or is that not the responsibility of the federal government?”; “In your opinion, should the US accept more or fewer Mexican immigrants?”.

Table A15. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of agriculture in Denmark.

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	51.9	52.5	-	52.7	52.3
Gender (pct. male)	53.0	49.2	-	46.5	55.4
Vote (pct. rightwing)	52.3	52.1	-	49.0	56.1
News consumption	.85	.89	-	.85	.88
Political interest	-	-	-	-	-
Most important problem	.57	.58	-	.57	.60
Opinion	.23	.21	-	.24	.26
Left-right self- placement	-	-	-	-	-

Note: See note to Table A14.

Table A16. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of rural development in Denmark.

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	51.7	52.8	-	52.4	52.3
Gender (pct. male)	50.6	50.5	-	46.8	54.8
Vote (pct. rightwing)	51.8	50.6	-	52.2	57.8
News consumption	.86	.89	-	.85	.88
Political interest	-	-	-	-	-
Most important problem	.71	.67	-	.67	.68
Opinion	.30	.29	-	.30	.34
Left-right self- placement	-	-	-	-	-

Note: See note to Table A14.

Table A17. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of health in the US (study I).

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	25-44	25-44	25-44	25-44	25-44
Gender (pct. male)	49.7	54.8	43.7	54.3	58.3
Vote (pct. rightwing)	31.9	33.3	31.6	38.9	41.7
News consumption	-	-	-	-	-
Political interest	-	-	-	-	-
Most important problem	.76	.74	.75	.78	.73
Opinion	.35	.34	.35	.33	.36
Left-right self- placement	.42	.40	.40	.42	.45

Note: See note to Table A14. The age variable in the first US study uses brackets where 1 (- 18), 2 (18-24), 3 (25-34), 4 (35-44), 5 (45-54), 6 (55-64), 7 (65-74), 8 (75-84), 9 (85+). The average on this variable is 3.7 (std. 1.9).

Table A18. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of immigration in the US (study I).

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	25-44	25-44	25-44	25-44	25-44
Gender (pct. male)	50.8	52.5	52.7	51.8	55.4
Vote (pct. rightwing)	33.5	29.2	42.6	45.0	31.3
News consumption	-	-	-	-	-
Political interest	-	-	-	-	-
Most important problem Opinion	.57	.57	.59	.57	.55
Left-right self- placement	.43	.39	.44	.43	.40

Note: See note to Table A14. The age variable in the first US study uses brackets where 1 (- 18), 2 (18-24), 3 (25-34), 4 (35-44), 5 (45-54), 6 (55-64), 7 (65-74), 8 (75-84), 9 (85+). The average on this variable is 3.7 (std. 1.9).

Table A19. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of health in the US (study II).

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	39.4	38.4	-	-	-
Gender (pct. male)	49.3	56.3	-	-	-
Vote (pct. rightwing)	40.0	40.1	-	-	-
News consumption	-	-	-	-	-
Political interest	.72	.75	-	-	-
Most important problem	-	-	-	-	-
Opinion	.46	.45	-	-	-
Left-right self- placement	.46	.45	-	-	-

Note: See note to Table A14.

Table A20. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of immigration in the US (study II).

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	38.4	38.9	-	-	-
Gender (pct. male)	53.2	45.0	-	-	-
Vote (pct. rightwing)	26.7	28.6	-	-	-
News consumption	-	-	-	-	-
Political interest	.75	.75	-	-	-
Most important problem	-	-	-	-	-
Opinion	.46	.43	-	-	-
Left-right self- placement	.46	.43	-	-	-

Note: See note to Table A14.

Table A21. Respondent characteristics in the treatment and control groups on the issue of the economy in Australia.

	NEG	POS	PROBL	NEG /w PROBL	CONTROL
Age	47.0	47.3	47.5	47.1	47.8
Gender (pct. male)	51.2	53.2	47.6	43.8	49.1
Vote (pct. rightwing)	25.4	26.8	27.7	31.3	29.3
News consumption	-	-	-	-	-
Political interest	-	-	-	-	-
Most important problem	.71	.70	.70	.72	.67
Opinion	.49	.51	.50	.49	.50
Left-right self- placement	.49	.51	.50	.49	.50

Note: See note to Table A14.

Table A22. Manipulation Check

	Unempl. (DK)	Agriculture (DK)	Rural (DK)	Health (US I)	Immi. (US I)	Health (US II)	Immi. (US II)
NEG	.66 (.28)	.63 (.29)	.64 (.28)	.67 (.21)	.65 (.21)	.82 (.23)	.79 (.21)
POS	.58 (.27)	.62 (.26)	.59 (.24)	.59 (.26)	.60 (.22)	.71 (.29)	.66 (.26)
PROBLEM	.47 (.33)	.78 (.33)	.24 (.23)	.17 (.17)	.67 (.19)		

Note: “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. In the Danish study, respondents indicate on a ten-point scale to what extent they find the Social Democrats’ comment to the Liberals’ policy to be negative (0 not at all negative; 1 highly negative). In the US study I, respondents indicate on a ten-point scale if they would describe the statement as negative for the negative message (1 highly negative) and positive for the positive message (1 highly positive). In the US study II, respondents indicate on a seven-point scale to what extent they agree (1 is ‘strongly agree’) that the message was negative for negative messages and positive for positive messages.

Table A23. Balance Check.

	POS vs control	NEG vs control	PROBL vs control	NEG W/ PROBL vs control	NEG vs. POS	NEG w/ PROBL vs POS	NEG w/ PROBL vs PROBL	NEG w/ PROBL vs NEG
Age	0.36** (0.18)	0.20 (0.18)	0.26 (0.30)	0.34* (0.18)	-0.14 (0.18)	0.01 (0.19)	-0.33 (0.31)	0.14 (0.18)
Gender	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.15** (0.08)	-0.26** (0.12)	-0.28*** (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.15* (0.08)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.08)
Opinion	-0.19 (0.13)	0.00 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.19 (0.13)	0.15 (0.14)	0.06 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.13)
Target supporter	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.25** (0.13)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.13)	0.07 (0.08)
Constant	0.07 (0.14)	0.01 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.19)	0.03 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.15)	0.02 (0.19)	0.01 (0.14)
Observations	2801	2810	1123	2722	2737	2649	1099	2658
Wald chi ² test	13.0	9.0	9.5	17.9**	9.9	5.7	1.3	7.3

Note: “POS” refers to positive campaigning, “NEG” refers to negative campaigning, and “PROBL” refers to information about real-world problems. Logit models with fixed effects where the panels are issues within the experiments. The dependent variable is assignment to the treatment group, i.e. “PC” is assignment to “Positive communication” and not the control group. . Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two way). For Denmark and the first US study, the opinion variable uses an issue-specific opinion. For Australia and the second US study, the opinion variable uses left-right self-placement (see Table A14).

ⁱ Studies of backlash effects of negative campaigning in a multiparty context outside the US either report mixed or conditional findings (Morisi 2018), or find an effect (see, e.g., Pattie et al. 2011). Yet, since Pattie et al. (2011) do not distinguish issue-based attacks from person-based attacks, it is hard to draw any conclusions for our study.

ⁱⁱ The control groups in the Danish and US (I) studies indicate issue ownership in the samples. On health in the US, the Democrats are as expected rated higher than the Republicans (.57 vs. .26). On immigration in the US, Democrats are surprisingly rated higher than Republicans (.53 vs. .35). This counters previous research and probably reflect that Liberals are over-represented in the US (I) survey (see Table A14 in the on-line appendix). On unemployment in Denmark, Social democrats are as expected rated higher than the Liberals (.42 vs. .34). On agriculture in Denmark, Social democrats are surprisingly rated higher than the Liberals (.46 vs. .37). The explanation might be that the agricultural reform, adopted six months before the survey, received a lot of criticisms from experts and opposition parties. On rural development in Denmark, Social democrats are rated equal to the Liberals as expected (.40 vs. .42).

ⁱⁱⁱ 24 respondents were excluded because of non-compliance. The median time spent on the survey is nine minutes.

^{iv} The median time spent on the survey is five minutes. The completion rate is 93 percent.

^v The full information material, dataset, and report can be downloaded from the Electoral Integrity Project website, at <https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/the-australian-voter-experience/>.

^{vi} This result holds for the US (I) experiment and the Danish experiment, but not the Australian experiment (see Tables A19 in the on-line appendix).

^{vii} This result is mainly driven by the US (I) experiment and not the Australian experiment (see Tables A20 in the on-line appendix).